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became mortal; and clearly they are using words which are familiar
to themselves, yet what they have said about the very application
of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the gods taste
of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the
causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their
existence, how can gods who need food be eternal?-But into the subtleties
of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously;
those, however, who use the language of proof we must cross-examine
and ask why, after all, things which consist of the same elements
are, some of them, eternal in nature, while others perish. Since these
philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things
should be as they say, evidently the principles or causes of things
cannot be the same. Even the man whom one might suppose to speak most
consistently-Empedocles, even he has made the same mistake; for he
maintains that strife is a principle that causes destruction, but
even strife would seem no less to produce everything, except the One;
for all things excepting God proceed from strife. At least he says:-
"
"From which all that was and is and will be hereafter-
"Trees, and men and women, took their growth,
"And beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
"And long-aged gods. "
"The implication is evident even apart from these words; for if strife
had not been present in things, all things would have been one, according
to him; for when they have come together, 'then strife stood outermost.'
Hence it also follows on his theory that God most blessed is less
wise than all others; for he does not know all the elements; for he
has in him no strife, and knowledge is of the like by the like. 'For
by earth,' he says, "
"we see earth, by water water,
"By ether godlike ether, by fire wasting fire,
"Love by love, and strife by gloomy strife. "
But-and this is the point we started from this at least is evident,
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METAPHYSICS 31
that on his theory it follows that strife is as much the cause of
existence as of destruction. And similarly love is not specially the
cause of existence; for in collecting things into the One it destroys
all other things. And at the same time Empedocles mentions no cause
of the change itself, except that things are so by nature.
"But when strife at last waxed great in the limbs of the
"Sphere,
"And sprang to assert its rights as the time was fulfilled
"Which is fixed for them in turn by a mighty oath. "
"This implies that change was necessary; but he shows no cause of
the necessity. But yet so far at least he alone speaks consistently;
for he does not make some things perishable and others imperishable,
but makes all perishable except the elements. The difficulty we are
speaking of now is, why some things are perishable and others are
not, if they consist of the same principles.
"Let this suffice as proof of the fact that the principles cannot
be the same. But if there are different principles, one difficulty
is whether these also will be imperishable or perishable. For if they
are perishable, evidently these also must consist of certain elements
(for all things that perish, perish by being resolved into the elements
of which they consist); so that it follows that prior to the principles
there are other principles. But this is impossible, whether the process
has a limit or proceeds to infinity. Further, how will perishable
things exist, if their principles are to be annulled? But if the principles
are imperishable, why will things composed of some imperishable principles
be perishable, while those composed of the others are imperishable?
This is not probable, but is either impossible or needs much proof.
Further, no one has even tried to maintain different principles; they
maintain the same principles for all things. But they swallow the
difficulty we stated first as if they took it to be something trifling.
"(11) The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary
for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity are the substances
of things, and whether each of them, without being anything else,
is being or unity respectively, or we must inquire what being and
unity are, with the implication that they have some other underlying
nature. For some people think they are of the former, others think
they are of the latter character. Plato and the Pythagoreans thought
being and unity were nothing else, but this was their nature, their
essence being just unity and being. But the natural philosophers take
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