[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
truth collapses like a financial system with no cash basis whatever. 22
In establishing this criterion for validating hypotheses, James was actually corroborating
the criterion already used by the empirical sciences. Scientific theories have never been
validated by their correspondence to some independent, objective reality. Rather, science
has always bootstrapped its way to more and more valid (or less and less flawed)
theories. As science progresses, theories that previously seemed valid are discovered to
be flawed, or are recognized as limiting cases of a more comprehensive theory, and are
replaced by new conclusions or working hypotheses. In addition to the purely epistemic
criteria of valid theories, there have always been pragmatic considerations; for scientists
have long been concerned with the usefulness of any given theory.
Is the question of the validity of our perceptions simply a matter of our local
epistemology and the standards of the time? Not if we accept a hypothesis that there is a
level of human perception and rationality that is primary, in the sense that humans
throughout history, in diverse cultures, experience and understand the world in
common.23 Thus, the meaning and reference of reasonableness and justification may be at
least partially equated across changes in our epistemological paradigms from one culture
and era to another.
If all true statements fall within a conventional/factual spectrum, as Putnam
proposes, we are then presented with the challenge of placing specific assertions within a
corresponding spectrum of subjectivity and objectivity. Statements such as My own
musical compositions are the most beautiful I have ever heard, David is my best
friend, and My way of preparing escargot makes for an exceptionally delicious
appetizer may all be true for a specific individual at a specific time in his or her life, but
their truthfulness may stop there. Other statements concerning laws, moral codes, music,
art, and language usage may generally be true only for a specific human society and not
for others. Further along the spectrum toward objectivity, statements concerning
immediate perceptual experience, for example, unrefined wool cloth has a coarse
texture and ginger has a pungent fragrance, may be true for some species but not for
others. Finally, some assertions may be true for all conscious beings, without reference to
their kinds of sensory faculties, modes of cognition, or their locations in space or time.
The laws of physics and mathematics are believed by some to fall into this category,
while certain religious statements are believed by others to be true for everyone for all
time.
Religious believers may assert that certain statements are true from God s own
perspective, while advocates of scientific materialism may assert that scientific truths are
valid without reference to any perspective whatsoever. Once again we are confronted
with the transition from a God s-eye view to a view from nowhere. For all statements,
however, ranging from the most personal and subjective to the most impersonal and
objective, there is a deeply ingrained tendency to reify their truths. That is, while all our
statements are contingent upon our cognitive faculties, these subjective elements are
easily forgotten or overlooked; and we easily come to view our assertions concerning the
objects of our knowledge and beliefs as being objectively true in an absolute sense.
Returning the Mind to Nature
A major incentive for James s formulation of radical empiricism was to
reintroduce the mind, including sensory and mental phenomena, into nature, from which
it had been divorced by the theologically motivated, mechanistic philosophy of
Descartes. Modern science has given us every reason to conclude that sensory
phenomena, such as colors, sounds, smells, and so on, do not exist independently in the
objective, physical world. Rather, these are events that arise in dependence on outer
phenomena such as electromagnetic radiation and on the inner workings of the brain. In
the absence of a brain, as far as we know, there are no phenomena of visual forms, sound,
smell, taste, or tactile sensations. Nevertheless, we experience the world around us as if it
consists of these phenomena independently of our perceptions of them. While the world
of our sensory experience appears to have an objective reality, in fact it is more like a
dreamscape or a rainbow: it can be perceived, but the objects as they are perceived have
no independent, objective existence. Likewise, the subjective mind itself may also be
nothing more than a matrix of events arising in dependence on other events, much as a
rainbow occurs as a result of the interplay of light and raindrops.
These hypotheses concerning the nature of the world of human experience and
consciousness have been suggested by many cognitive scientists, but they generally adopt
the view of scientific materialism of contrasting the unreal world of the mind with the
real, objective world of physical science. The underlying metaphysical supposition here
is that the real world conceived by science, beyond the veil of subjective appearances,
exists independently of humans percepts and concepts. The problem with this belief is
that the world of science is described in human languages, using terms drawn from our
human senses. Indeed, the very concept of the real external world of everyday thinking
rests exclusively on sense impressions. Even such abstract notions as electromagnetic
fields, superstrings, gravity waves, and black holes are linked to our sensory experiences
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]